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Abstract:
This study analyzes the relationship between board size and economic-financial performance in a sample 
of European firms that constitute the EUROSTOXX50 Index. Based on previous literature, resource dependency 
and agency theories, and considering regulation developed by the OECD and European Union on the normative 
of corporate governance for each country in the sample, the authors propose the hypotheses of both positive 
linear and quadratic relationships between the researched parameters. Using ROA as a benchmark of financial 
performance and the number of members of the board as measurement of the board size, two OLS estimations are 
performed. To confirm the robustness of the results the empirical study is tested with two other similar financial 
ratios, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Due to the absence of significant results, an additional factor, firm size, is employed in 
order to check if it affects firm performance. Delving further into the nature of this relationship, it is revealed that 
there exists a strong and negative relation between firm size and financial performance. Consequently, it can be 
asseverated that the generic recommendation “one size fits all” cannot be applied in this case; which conforms to 
the Recommendations of the European Union that dissuade using generic models for all countries.
Keywords:
 Corporate governance, board size, ROA, ROE, Tobin´s Q, EUROSTOXX50 Index.
Resumen:
Este estudio analiza la relación entre el tamaño del consejo de administración y el rendimiento económico-
financiero de una muestra de empresas europeas que componen el EUROSTOXX50. Revisando trabajos anterio-
res en la materia y teniendo en cuenta además de la teoría de dependencia de recursos y la teoría de la agencia, 
la regulación que se ha desarrollado desde la OCDE, la Unión Europea, y la relativa al gobierno corporativo de 
cada país de la muestra, los autores proponen la existencia de una relación positiva entre las dos ideas investiga-
das. Tomando en consideración el número de consejeros y varias medidas del rendimiento económico-financiero 
(ROA, ROE y Q de Tobin), se realiza la estimación estadística y ante la ausencia de resultados significativos se 
infiere la existencia de factores adicionales, como el tamaño empresarial, influyentes en la relación. Indagando 
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en este otro factor se llega a una importante conclusión: el hecho de que existe una fuerte y negativa relación 
entre el tamaño de la compañia y el correspondiente rendimiento financiero. Por tanto, se puede aseverar que la 
recomendación genérica “un tamaño vale para todo” en este estudio no es aplicable, lo que, por otro lado, va 
en consonancia con las recomendaciones de la Unión Europea que desaconsejan modelos genéricos para todos 
los países integrantes.
Palabras clave: 
Gobierno corporativo, tamaño del consejo de administración, ROA, ROE, Q de Tobin, índice EUROSTOXX 50.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of the present work is to analyze if there is a relationship between the 
size of the boards of directors and the respective financial performance of firms. It also 
aims to find the role that best defines this relationship. We analyzed a sample of European 
companies that make up the EUROSTOXX50 in 2012, taking corporate governance and 
financial data for the year 2010.
The interest of the work lies in the possibility of investigating one of the characteris-
tics of the board of directors that supposedly has a direct impact on the value of financial 
performance. The number of board members is a fundamental aspect in the development 
of the functions that has been entrusted to the board of directors; thus, the direction taken 
by the firms is a consequence of how the functions assigned to this body are carried out. 
It is our belief that Europe’s economic reality demands more and more studies of this 
type, which investigate the governance structures of companies that have an important role 
in our global economy; and, how these internal forms of governance can be the cause of 
changes in the levels of economic profitability achieved. The size of the board has tradi-
tionally been a widely debated issue in the financial press, focusing on both its increase 
and decrease. News constantly appearing on changes in the boards of the large European 
companies has become a controversial issue. While more members on the board mean a 
greater contribution of experience and contacts favorable to the company, the associated 
cost, in terms of remuneration to the trustees, is a factor not to be taken lightly. 
Considering the deepening link between the size of the board and the profitability of 
the firm, it is appropriate to outline, through the review of the different guidelines and 
principles relating to corporate governance of the countries included in the sample of firms 
(Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg), the standpoint of 
the various European bodies. Hence, the position taken in regards to the size of the board, 
and, in the mechanisms established by the board of the companies in the sample is analyzed 
in order to establish what is considered an appropriate size.
The work discusses both the OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) and the 
European regulations on corporate governance, and attempts to uncover the causes that 
have led to the proliferation of codes of good governance in the member countries of the 
European Union and the OECD. Likewise, the codes of the countries in the sample are 
reviewed, with the aim, in reference to board size, of extrapolating the recommendation in 
each of these. In the analysis we have used the original corporate governance and financial 
data of the companies in the sample for the year 2010. Via both the linear and quadratic 
regression statistical models, we have posited the equations that relate both objects of re-
search.
The research was divided into several sections. First, a review of the literature and 
presentation of the theories that provide the foundations for the basic assumption of the 
study is performed. Next, we introduce the most relevant works in this area and discuss 
the guidelines set by the OECD and the European Union, as well as the codes of good 
governance of the countries in the sample, with regard to corporate governance. In the 
third section we expose the assumptions of the work that gave rise to the formulation of 
the econometric model used in our analysis; this, along with the presentation of the display 
and the data used, is listed in the subsequent part. In the fifth section, we proceed to the 
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empirical application of the defined model and explain the results of that analysis. Finally, 
the sixth segment presents the findings of the study and outlines suggestions for future lines 
of investigation.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EM-
PIRICAL EVIDENCE
The question of whether a greater number of trustees bring about better financial results 
to the companies depends in a positive sense on the theory of resource dependency; and, 
some authors analyze the boards of directors (Barroso et al. 2011) based on this theory. 
From this perspective the board members are the nexus between the company and the 
resources it needs to maximize value (Pfeffer 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978); in this 
way realizing that a larger number of members in the council entail greater possibilities for 
obtaining resources. The council represents in itself a fundamental resource for the com-
pany by its ability to link with the outside (Palmer and Barber 2001).  Facing competition, 
the council can bring forth an advantage which is difficult to imitate (Barney 1991; Grant 
1991).
Considering that the theory of agency (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama 
and Jensen 1983) supports any mechanism that solves the conflict of interest between ma-
nagers and owners, the board of directors is seen as a good tool to align their respective 
competing interests. We can therefore deduce that councils with a large number of mem-
bers could exercise better control on managers than those with a smaller number (Freeman 
1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Donaldson 1999; Frooman 1999).
A linear relationship between size and financial performance should not be assumed in 
spite of the fact that both theories – agency and resource dependency - show a positive rela-
tionship between the two concepts. The size of the council must provide a balance between 
the advantages and disadvantages of an increase of a new member to the council. The main 
benefit derived from the incorporation of additional members to the council, in addition to 
those already identified in the two theories, consists of the capacity and experience that the 
new member can contribute to the body. The most notable disadvantages stem from diffi-
culties in communication, coordination, and the delays that occur in the decision-making 
process. Possible counterparts to large boards are 1) the asymmetry in the information held 
by the president of the board and the director of the company (Conyon and Peck 1998), 
and 2) a tendency to make new appointments instead of replacements, as is usually done in 
councils of a more limited size (Mak and Kusnadi 2005). Thus, some researchers have fo-
cused their research on inquiring as to what is the optimum number of trustees (Fernández 
et al. 1998; De Andrés and Vallelado 2008).
Corporate governance involves one more element to add to the regulatory framework 
under which firms must operate. To improve its functioning, codes of good practices have 
arisen, more commonly known as Codes for Good Governance, which focus on the aspects 
of operation and the structures of the councils. All the countries that make up the sample 
(Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg) have developed 
codes of good governance following both the recommendations of the OECD and those of 
the European Union. The principles of corporate governance promulgated by the OECD 
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(2004) established a guideline for all listed companies: for the development of non-binding 
standards that, while respecting existing national law, promote good practices in corporate 
governance. The principles adopted in the year 1999 focused mainly on the problem of se-
parating ownership and control; but also dealt with other aspects, such as the shareholding 
structure.
Furthermore, the European Union encourages the Member States to adopt the prin-
ciples of the OECD; and, in its recommendations for corporate governance (EU 2012) 
indicates that countries must establish their own rules - hence are not obliged to follow a 
single pattern: “one size fits all” - adapted to company specifics (Seidl et al. 2013). It is 
appropriate to set a limit to the number of members that compose the board of directors in 
order to promote the quality of this body.
After analyzing the various codes developed in the nations of our sample study, we 
conclude that in only a few countries are indications clear on this aspect. A size of bet-
ween 5 and 15 members is recommended only in the case of Spain, and a maximum limit 
is given only for the case of Luxembourg; the remaining codes do not set any references. 
Nonetheless, 17 listed Spanish companies belonging to IBEX35 have boards of more than 
15 directors. These data suggest that half the companies comprising the IBEX 35 have very 
large boards - a situation that impairs the efficacy of this governing body and reduces the 
cohesion, involvement and accountability of its members (Gutierrez and Surroca 2012). 
Steen (2006) points out in his work that out of a total of 52 analyzed codes of good gover-
nance, in only 15% are limitations set on the size of the board.
Table 1
Relationship on good governance codes of countries in the sample, year of publication, year of 
last review and recommendation on size of the board
Country Existing Code Designation
First 
edition
Last 
revision
Recommended 
Board Size
Belgium Belgian Corporate Governance Code 1998 2009 Unspecified
France Recommendations on corporate gover-nance 1995 2011 Unspecified
Germany German Corporate Governance Code 1998 2012 Unspecified
Italy Italian Corporate Governance Code 1999 2011 Unspecified
Luxembourg
The Ten Principles of Corporate 
Governance of the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange
2003 2009 Maximum 16
Netherlands Dutch Corporate Governance Code 1997 2008 Unspecified
Spain Unified Code of Good Governance: Report Conthe 1998 2006 From 5 to 15
Source: Own elaboration.
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The first codes of good governance emerged in the nineteen nineties, but on the benefits 
of their application some doubts exist (Soltani and Maupetit 2013). The fault that some 
scholars find lies in the lack of empirical evidence to support the contained recommenda-
tions (Steen 2006).  For other authors (Cuervo 2002), the main stumbling block revolves 
around the lack of applicability; as such, they are in favor of promoting market control 
mechanisms, as opposed to merely enhancing governance codes. 
Criticism is directed at the European countries, where the codes lack legal force and 
systems are geared towards large shareholders.  In contrast, countries with an Anglo-Ame-
rican tradition develop market control systems, and codes stand as laws - these countries 
possess legal systems where the laws are drafted in Parliament. The Anglo-American coun-
tries, unlike the Europeans, uphold systems that differ in the fundamental aspect that codes 
have the attribute of law that companies must abide by (Goergen et al. 2008).
Bearing in mind that this study takes a sample of European countries, we set out to 
determine whether the recommendations on size, as established in the codes, are correct 
or not. Nevertheless, we must question if boards with a higher number of directors have a 
direct and positive impact on financial performance. 
Studies to date, including those where no relationship has been found to exist at all, 
have produced mixed results. There are studies in samples of Eurozone countries that have 
found a positive relationship between size and profitability: Alves and Mendes (2004) in 
Portugal; Barroso et al. (2009, 2010); Fernández et al. (1998); and Rodríguez Fernández et 
al. (2013) in Spain. This has also been the case in international samples, or from countries 
outside Europe: Dalton et al. (1999) and Larmou and Vafeas (2010) in international com-
panies; Jackling and Johl (2009) and Raja and Kumar (2008) in India; Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003) in Australia; McIntyre et al. (2007) in Canada; Reddy et al. (2010) in New Zealand, 
and finally, Uadiale (2010) in Nigeria.
The negative relationship has been manifested in the studies on European countries by 
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) in Greece; Guest (2009) in England and O’Conell and Cramer 
(2010) in Ireland. Also in studies by Daraghma and Alsinawi (2010) in Palestine; De An-
dres et al. (2005) in North America and Eastern Europe; Dey and Chauchan (2009) and 
Kota and Tomar (2010) in India; and Dowell et al. (2011) in the international arena.
The lack of relationship has been presented in the studies of Crespi (2010) in Spain; Di 
Pietra et al. (2008) in Italy; Beiner et al. (2004) in Switzerland, Lehn et al. (2009) in the 
USA; Yammeesri and Herath (2010) in Thailand and finally, Dalton et al. (1998) and Gill 
et al. (2009) in international samples.
Moreover, multiple investigations have attempted to calculate the optimal number of 
members that must compose the board of directors in order to maximize company financial 
performance. Guest (2009) analyzed a sample of English companies between the years 
1981 and 2002 and concluded that in boards with greater than 9 members financial yields 
deteriorate. In the study conducted by De Andres and Vallelado (2008) on a sample of 69 
banks in six countries of Europe and North America the optimal size is found to be 19; 
and, Fernández et al. (1998) in a sample analyzed in Spain during the year 1993 obtains a 
similar size, between 17 and 18.
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3. HYPOTHESES FORMULATION
For the formulation of the hypotheses we will use as framework the work of Rodríguez 
Fernández et al. (2013) where the authors compiled a comprehensive series of studies that 
related various structural characteristics of the board with company financial performance. 
Specifically, for board size they identified 12 studies where the relationship was positive, 8 
where it was negative, and 5 where no relationship existed. Table 2 shows these relations.
Table 2
Studies, characteristics, and board size
Study Country
Board 
size
Theories
Listed
Y=Yes
N=No
Profitability
Measurement
Alves and 
Mendes 2004
 
Portugal + - Y ROA
Ameer et al. 
2010
Malaysia
Agency, Stew-
ardship and 
Resource depen-
dence theory
Y Tobin’s Q
Baliga et al. 
1996
USA Agency theory N ROA, ROE
Barroso et al. 
2009
Spain +
Agency, Steward-
ship, Resource 
dependence 
theories
Y
Economic profit-
ability as
a control vari-
able
Barroso et al.  
2011
Spain + Resource depen-dence theory Y -
Bhagat and 
Black 2002
USA Empirical study N ROA, Tobin’s Q
Brick and 
Chindamba-
ran  2010
USA Empirical study N ROA, Tobin’s Q
Crespi 2010 Spain Without Relation - Y ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q
Dalton et al. 
1998
Internatio-
nal
Agency and 
Stewardship 
theories
N
ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q
Dalton et al. 
1999
Internatio-
nal +
Agency, Steward-
ship, Resource 
dependence 
theories
N
ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q
Daraghma 
and Alsinawi 
2010
Palestine - - Y Return on reve-nues or sales
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De Andrés et 
al. 2005
Western  
Europe and 
Northame-
rica
- Agency theory N M/B , ROA, Ver-sion of Tobin’s Q
Dey and 
Chauchan 
2009
India - Agency theory Y
Market Value 
Added and 
Tobin’s Q
Di Pietra et 
al. 2008
Italy WithoutRelation Agency theory Y M/B
Dowell et al. 
2011
Internatio-
nal - Agency theory Y
Measure of 
financial distress
Drakos and 
Bekiris 2010
Greece - Agency theory Y ROA, Tobin’s Q
Ehikioya 
2009
Nigeria Agency theory Y ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q
Elsayed 2007 Egypt
Agency, Stew-
ardship and Con-
tingency theory
Y Tobin’s Q, ROA
Fernandez et 
al. 1998
Spain + Agency theory Y Tobin’s Q
Ferris et al. 
2003
USA Agency theory N M/B
Fich and 
Shivdasani 
2006
USA - N M/B, ROA
Gill et al. 
2009
Internatio-
nal
Without
Relation Agency theory N
ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q
Guest 2009
United 
Kingdom
- - Y ROA, Tobin’s Q
Hu et al. 2010 China - Y Tobin’s Q
Jackling and 
Johl 2009
India +
Agency and 
Resource depen-
dence theories
Y ROA, Tobin’s Q
Judge et al. 
2003
Russia
Agency theory 
and Institutional 
Perspectives
N
Financial Profi-
tability
Kaczmarek et 
al. 2011
UK
Agency theory 
and Social identi-
ty theory
Y Tobin’s Q
Kiel and 
Nicholson 
2003
Australia + Resource depen-dence theory Y ROA, Tobin’s Q
Kota and 
Tomar 2010
India -
Agency, Stew-
ardship and Man-
agerial hegemony 
theories
Y Tobin’s Q
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Larmou and 
Vafeas 2010
Internatio-
nal + - N
M/B and Op-
erating Income 
before
depreciation 
divided by total 
assets
Lehn et al. 
2009
USA WithoutRelation Agency theory Y M/B
Lin et al. 
2009
China Agency theory Y Sales revenue
McIntyre et 
al. 2007
Canada +
Agency and 
Behavioural 
theories
Y ROA, Tobin’s Q, EVA
Miwa and 
Ramseyer 
2005
Japan Reformist theory Y Tobin’s Q and ROI
Mura 2007
United 
Kingdom
- Y Tobin’s Q
O´Connell 
and Cramer 
2010
Ireland - Agency theory Y RET and FI-
NANCIAL Q
Raja and 
Kumar 2008
India + Agency theory Y Tobin’s Q
Reddy et al. 
2010
New Zea-
land + Agency theory Y
ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
M/B
Schmid and 
Zimmermann 
2008
Switzerland Agency theory Y Tobin’s Q
Stanwick and 
Stanwick 
2010
Canada
Agency and 
Resource depen-
dence theories
N
Ratio of sales to 
net income
Tin Yan Lam 
and Shu Kam 
Lee 2008
Hong-Kong  
Agency and 
Stewardship 
theories
Y ROA, ROE, ROCE,M/B
Uadiale 2010 Nigeria + Agency theory Y ROE, ROCE
Yammeesri 
and Herath 
2010
Thailand WithoutRelation Agency theory Y Tobin’s Q
Source: Own elaboration based on Rodriguez Fernandez et al. (2013).
In spite of the fact that both the theory of resource dependency and the theory of agency 
indicate a positive relationship between financial performance and board size, a lack of em-
pirical homogeneity has been demonstrated. Taking into account 1) that the council should 
seek a balance between the advantages and disadvantages derived from the incorporation 
of new members, 2) that investigations have found evidence of the quadratic nature of the 
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relationship (Fernández et al. 1998; De Andres and Vallelado 2008), and 3) that the OECD, 
the European Union and a number of good governance codes explicitly refer to imposing a 
limit on the number of directors - whereas in others, at the very least, the recommendation 
is given to monitor this aspect so as to not create problems of coordination, communication 
and dilatoriness in the decision-making process caused by an excess number of members 
in the council - we expect to find both positive and quadratic relationships in the analyses 
to be performed. Henceforth, we establish the following base hypotheses as:
Hypothesis 1: Company financial performance is positively related to the size of the board 
of directors.
Hypothesis 2: Above a given optimal number of directors in the governing council, com-
pany financial performance is adversely affected.
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Sample and data collection
The initial sample of the study is composed of those companies that made up the EU-
ROSTOXX50 index in October 2012; they have been identified through the http://www.
stoxx.com page. The EUROSTOXX50 index covers 12 countries in the euro zone, all 
members of the OECD (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Neth-
erlands, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal), and includes the 50 leading companies from 
different sectors. On the date of the data query (accessed October 4, 2012) there was no 
company from either Austria, Greece or Portugal.
Financial data have been obtained from the database http://money.msn.com/ and http://
es.finance.yahoo.com/; and thereafter checked with Amadeus. The corporate data have 
been obtained from the SSBI reports (Spencer Stuart Board Index)2 as well as from the 
annual reports on corporate governance published by the companies located on the web 
pages of the companies themselves, or from the respective stock exchanges. The financial 
data, as well as the corporate governance data, correspond to the year 2010.
The final sample of data is made up of 47 companies from seven countries: Germany, 
Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Three companies included in 
the EUROSTOXX50 were left out of the study due to lack of financial data (one each from 
Germany and Finland, and another from Ireland). The index comprises the Eurozone´s 
main super sector leaders, hence we deem the sample size adequate for our purpose.
2  Reports obtained in the page http://www.spencerstuart.com
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4.2. Regression Model
Based on resource dependency theory and agency theory, and following the model 
suggested by De Andres and Vallelado (2008), we will analyze the following regression 
model:
Financial Performance = α + β1.N_CONSEJEROS + β2.N_CONSEJEROS2 + 
β3.LNASSETS + β4.VARIABLES_CONTROL + € 
Financial performance is the dependent variable and is measured through the ROA 
(return on assets) ratio, which is calculated as the quotient between the operating profit 
before depreciation, amortizations, provisions, and total assets. To analyze the robustness 
of the model we will make use of two additional ratios, 1) ROE (return on equity), which is 
calculated as the quotient between the operating profit before depreciation, amortizations, 
provisions, and stockholders equity, and 2) Tobin’s Q ratio, the result of dividing company 
market value by its book value. These ratios were selected in accordance with previous 
analysis carried out by other authors in this field (Dalton et al. 1999; Alves and Mendes 
2004; De Andres and Vallelado 2008; Guest 2009; Jackling and Johl 2009; Crespi 2010).
The independent variable that represents the size of the council is N_CONSEJEROS, 
the number of members comprising the board of directors. The other explanatory variable 
that has been included is LNASSETS, which represents the size of the firm and is calculat-
ed as the natural logarithm of total assets. Some authors (Guest 2009) have identified that 
financial performance is positively related with company size and include it as a control 
variable in the analysis between financial performance and size of the company. In addi-
tion, we include other control variables for sector, type of council (single or dual), and 
the group to which the council belongs – classified according to the observed size (small 
councils, fewer than 10 members; medium councils, 10 to 18 members; and large councils, 
greater than 18). The latter variables have been included by taking into account the ob-
served variance of sizes and in line with the investigation of De Andres et al. (2005), who 
proposed a similar variable.  
For the study of the hypotheses, two multivariate regression models are suggested: one 
corresponds to a linear model and the other to a quadratic model. The linear model serves 
to test hypothesis 1 and is represented by the equation:
Financial Performance = α + β1.N_CONSEJEROS + β2.LNASSETS + 
β3.VARIABLES_CONTROL + € 
The quadratic model tests hypothesis 2 and is represented by:
Financial Performance = α + β1.N_CONSEJEROS + β2.N_CONSEJEROS2 + 
β3.LNASSETS + β4.VARIABLES_CONTROL + € 
To carry out the statistical analysis we have run the econometric software EViews 5.0, 
widely used in empirical research.
5. ANALYSIS OF DATA AND RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
The observations correspond to European companies from different nations. For later 
analysis, data must first be grouped by country. Table 3, below, shows the number of com-
panies by country, company average size of council by country, and the number of compa-
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nies in which the council is divided as a function of task: control and monitoring (executive 
board and supervisory board).
Table 3
Number of firms, average size of the council, and number of companies with dual council by 
countries
Country No. of companies Average size the 
council
Companies with dual 
councils
Belgium 1 13.0 1
France 18 14.3 0
Germany 12 25.7 12
Italy 5 15.8 0
Luxembourg 1 9.0 0
Netherlands 4 13.0 3
Spain 6 14.7 0
Total 47 17.2 16
Source: Own elaboration.
The average board is composed of 17.2 members; as shown in Table 3, only in Ger-
many do boards of directors on average consist of more than 16 members. Smaller gover-
ning boards are the norm in Luxembourg and the Netherlands, whereas in countries such 
as France, Italy and Spain the average number of directors is in the 14 to 15 members 
range. Germany has the highest average size, just under 26 directors; noteworthy is that all 
German companies in the sample have dual boards. In addition to the German firms, one 
Belgian and three Dutch firms favor dual councils; however, in these two countries average 
board size is considerably less.
In the chart shown below we have tabulated the total number of companies for each 
council size. We observe that a council of 14 board members is the most common, followed 
by councils of 12 and 13 members.
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Figure 1
Total number of companies as a function of number of council board members
Source: Own elaboration.
The following table lists the total number of companies integrating each of the sectors; 
they are the Spanish equivalents of those indicated by EUROSTOXX50 (see Appendix).
Table 4
Classification of companies by sector
Sector Number of companies
Consumer Goods 6
Consumer Services 4
Financial Services and Real Estate 5
Banks 8
Construction, Manufacturing and Materials 8
Technology and Telecom. 13
Petroleum and Energy 3
Total 47
Source: Own elaboration.
The following table shows the total number of companies with dual boards, classified 
by country and by sector.
Number of directors
N
um
be
r o
f c
om
pa
ni
es
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Table 5
Number of companies with dual boards, classified by sector and by country
 
Consumer 
Goods
Consumer 
Services
Financial 
Services and 
Real Estate
Construction, 
Manufacturing 
and Materials
Technolo-
gy and 
Telecom.
Total 
Belgium   1   1
France       
Germany 2 1  5 4 12
Italy       
Luxembourg       
Netherlands  1  2  3
Spain       
Source: Own elaboration.
All German companies have dual boards, as do three of the Dutch and the sole Belgian 
company that integrate the sample. Withal, of the 16 companies that presented this parti-
cularity, almost half of them belong to the construction, industry and materials sector; the 
rest is divided between consumer goods and services, technology and telecommunications, 
financial services and real estate.
In Table 6 we have recorded the most significant values of the sample data.
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for the variables
ROE2010 ROA2010 TOBINQ2010 N_CONSEJEROS LNASSETS2010
Media 13.20 4.63 3.11 17.17 4.98
Median 11.60 3.60 2.15 15.00 4.82
Maximum 41.60 17.60 10.04 32.00 7.87
Minimum 2.10 0.10 0.82 9.00 1.92
Standard 
Deviation 8.02 4.15 2.18 6.15 1.46
Total 47 47 47 47 47
Source: Own elaboration.
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The minimum and maximum values for the number of council members are 9 and 32 res-
pectively.
As to correlations between variables, we underline that in view of the values shown in Table 
7, the variable N_CONSEJEROS is negatively correlated with the three financial ratios that 
represent the dependent variable, ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q – ROA showing the greatest corre-
lation. Variable LNASSETS2010 displays a negative correlation with the dependent variables.
Table 7
Pearson’s correlations of variables in the regression model
ROE2010 ROA2010
TO-
BINQ2010
N_CONSEJE-
ROS LNASSETS2010
ROE2010 1
ROA2010 0.659 1
TOBINQ2010 0.681 0.788 1
N_CONSEJEROS -0,134 -0,288 -0,177 1
LNASSETS2010 -0,479 -0,752 -0,729 0.317 1
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 8
Results of the regression analysis
Variables ROA2010 ROE2010 TOBINQ2010
Analysis 1 Analysis 2 Analysis 1 Analysis 2 Analy-sis 1 Analysis 2
α (constant) 15,676 13,340 26,077 25,092 8,317 6,518
N_CONSEJEROS
-0.037
(0,599)
-0.249
(0,572)
0.0259 
(0,888)
0,147 
(0,898)
0.0212 
(0,518)
0,241 
(0,375)
N_CONSEJE-
ROS2
-0.007 
(0,511 )
-0.003
(0,914 )
-0.006 
(0,384 )
LNASSETS2010
-2.089
(0.000) ***
-2.121 
(0.000) ***
-2.674 
(0.001) 
***
-2.688 
(0.0014)
-1.118 
(0.000) 
***
-1.142 
(0.003) 
***
R2 0,568 0,572 0,230 0,230 0,535 0.5445
Adjusted R2 0,548 0,542 0,195 0,177 0,514 0,513
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 2.04 2,071 2,301 2,300 1,905 1,965
F-statistic 28,900 19,168 6,577 4,290 25,342 17,150
Prob. (F-statistic) 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,010 0,000 0,000
Source: Own elaboration.
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The values exhibited in the columns (Table 8) are the βi coefficients that accompany the 
respective variables. Below, in brackets, we display the t statistic probability. The charac-
ters *, **, and *** correspond, respectively, to 10 %, 5% and 1% significance. The column 
“Analysis 1” presents the results for the linear model study (Hypothesis 1), whereas “Anal-
ysis 2” presents results for the quadratic model (Hypothesis 2).
The models are explanatory (prob. F < 0.05) in all cases; and, the model pertaining to 
the ROA (adjusted R2 0.548 in analysis 1, and 0.542 in analysis 2) gives the best results.  In 
none of the analysis have the variables N_CONSEJEROS and N_CONSEJEROS2 resulted 
significant; on the other hand, the variable reflecting the size of the firm (LNASSETS2010) 
shows significance. For this latter variable the relationship was negative in all cases (βi< 
0). Hence, neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2 have been proven; although, we have 
found that the variable LNASSETS2010 shows a strong negative relationship with finan-
cial performance.
After the completion of analysis 1 and 2 for the dependent variable ROA, variables 
ROE and Tobin’s Q were analyzed; as no significance variance was found in the different 
measures of performance or firm value, the robustness of results was proved.
When including the control variables in the analysis (sector, type of council and classi-
fication by council size) no significant relationship appeared that would allow differences 
to be established - a consequence of these characteristics - between the companies.
After carrying out the White test, no heteroscedasticity3 has been found, except in anal-
ysis 2 for the Tobin’s Q variable; in this latter case, we have computed White matrices and 
shown the results in Table 8.
Other econometric problems that might have been present in the models, multicol-
linearity4 and autocorrelation5, were tested and discarded (Gujarati 2003). Multicollinearity 
was ruled- out as there was no evidence for presuming a relationship between the inde-
pendent variables. Neither the statistical F nor the adjusted R2 values are excessively high; 
furthermore, some of the independent variables are significant. As regards autocorrelation, 
in all cases the Durbin Watson statistic lies within the limits of non-autocorrelation, i.e. 1.5 
< DW < 2.5 (Anatolyev 2003).
6. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this work we have analyzed the size of the board of directors and its relationship with 
company financial performance. In the first scenario we proposed a positive relationship 
between these two variables, and in the second scenario considered its plausible quadratic 
relationship.
Despite the solid theoretical basis, resource dependency theory and agency theory, and 
prior empirical evidence to support the positive sign of the relationship, none can be asser-
3  Heteroscedasticity occurs when the the principle of homoscedasticity is not met. Homoscedasticity is also known 
as homogeneity of variance.
4  Multicollinearity refers to the existence of a linear relationship between the variables.
5  Autocorrelation assumes that the variance associated with one given observation is not influenced by the variance 
associated with any other observation. 
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ted. For EUROSTOXX50, which consists of large European firms, the size of the board is 
a parameter that can be deemed largely irrelevant. However, an important conclusion has 
been derived: a strong negative relationship exists between company size and its corres-
ponding financial return; that is, given a constant number of board members, as company 
size increases financial performance decreases.
Nor can we recommend an optimum size, a consequence of the presumed inverted “U” 
quadratic form association, in spite of the fact that other authors already pointed to this 
type of relationship and obtained optimal numbers of board members; and that some of the 
codes of good governance set ranges limiting the size of the Council.
A further conclusion drawn is that board size depends on additional factors, such as 
company specifics, and how no one-size-fits-all recommendation can be given that would 
benefit all councils. The recommendations of the EU are explicit in this regard and suggest 
the inadequacy of employing generic models; throughout Europe (with the exception of 
Spain and Luxembourg) national governments do not establish recommendations on the 
adequate size of the board of directors in large companies. Noteworthy, all German com-
panies embrace board duality; a situation observed to a lesser degree in Dutch and Belgian 
firms. Certain authors question the similarities and recommendations of codes and, as a 
consequence of the consolidation of supporting empirical evidence, advocate for dialog 
between investors, companies and researchers to act as the driving force behind improve-
ments in the codes of good governance.
Moreover, adapting corporate governance codes periodically, in response to changing 
social, economic, and financial conditions, guarantees that standards are continuously res-
ponsive to the vagaries of the marketplace. In this regard we advocate for national gover-
nments to coordinate the setting of codes with governance professionals, such as the Inter-
national Corporate Governance Network (ICGN 2014), an organization which has gone a 
long way towards emphasizing the importance of proper corporate governance.
We have uncovered that a large variance exists in the size of the boards of directors in 
the different companies of the sample. However, we did not observe a common pattern that 
allowed us to suggest a relationship between council size and company sector, or between 
council size and firm performance.
Results have shown that increasing financial returns becomes an ever more difficult 
task as company size increases. Consequently, setting limits on its size can be deemed 
more important than targeting some ideal number of board members. Withal, our work 
clearly indicates an important duty of the board should consist in controlling company size; 
the focus should be on company size as opposed to board size, as our results demonstrate 
that a large company size depresses financial performance.
Hence, in light of our study and the lack of general recommendations on appropriate 
board size, we highlight the importance of considering company size as an additional fac-
tor to be taken into account when establishing codes of corporate governance; that is future 
recommendations on board size should be inextricably coupled with company size, given 
the strong linkage of the latter with financial performance. Furthermore, the main objective 
of the development of codes of good governance is not to enhance company financial re-
turns (at least not in the short term) but rather to improve the control mechanisms in order 
to increase the confidence of the owners (investors) with respect to the decisions taken by 
Company financial performance: Does board size matter? Case of the EUROSTOXX50 index
Cuadernos de Gestión Vol. 15 - Nº 2 (2015), pp. 15-38 ISSN: 1131 - 683732
the managers. From this vantage point, we advocate for the variable company size to be 
considered a constant over the long term.
Future research should strive to expand knowledge on the interplay between board size 
and firm size, and their dependency on financial results, across different geographic sphe-
res of activity and influence - notwithstanding the aim to analyze jointly other variables 
of the board in a sample of greater size encompassing a longer time period; such avenues 
should include the exploration of the different effects of the economic crisis that began in 
2008. 
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APPENDIX. LIST OF COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE EUROSTOXX50
Company name Sector Country code
AIR LIQUIDE Chemicals FR
ALLIANZ Insurance DE
Anheuser-Busch INBEV Food & Beverages BE
ARCELORMITTAL Basic Resources LU
ASML HLDG Technology NL
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI Insurance IT
AXA Insurance FR
BASF Chemicals DE
BAYER Chemicals DE
BCO BILBAO Vizcaya Argentaria Banks ES
BCO SANTANDER Banks ES
BMW Automobiles & Parts DE
BNP PARIBAS Banks FR
CARREFOUR Retail FR
CRH * Construction & Materials IE
DAIMLER * Automobiles & Parts DE
DANONE Food & Beverages FR
DEUTSCHE BANK Banks DE
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM Telecommunications DE
E. ON Utilities DE
ENEL Utilities IT
ENI Oil & Gas IT
ESSILOR INTERNATIONAL Healthcare FR
FRANCE TELECOM Telecommunications FR
GDF Suez Utilities FR
GRP Société Générale Banks FR
IBERDROLA Utilities ES
INDITEX Retail ES
ING GRP Insurance NL
INTESA SANPAOLO Banks IT
L’OREAL Personal & Household Goods FR
LVMH Moet Hennessy Personal & Household Goods FR
MUENCHENER RUECK Insurance DE
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NOKIA * Technology FI
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS Industrial goods & services NL
REPSOL Oil & Gas ES
RWE Utilities DE
SAINT GOBAIN Construction & Materials FR
SANOFI Healthcare FR
SAP Technology DE
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Industrial goods & services FR
SIEMENS Industrial goods & services DE
TELEFONICA Telecommunications ES
TOTAL Oil & Gas FR
Unibail RODAMCO- Real Estate FR
UNICREDIT Banks IT
Unilever NV Food & Beverages NL
VINCI Construction & Materials FR
VIVENDI Media FR
VOLKSWAGEN PREF Automobiles & Parts DE
  
* Companies that have not been included in the final sample for lack of data. 
Source: Own elaboration with data of EUROSTOXX50 
